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MAISLIN INDUSTRIES, US., INC. V PRIMARY STEEL, INC.. WHAT
HAPPENED TO DEFERENCE9
A BASIC PRINCIPLE of administrative law is that considera-ble deference should be accorded to an agency's construction of
the statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.' In Maislin In-
dustries, U.S., Inc. v Primary Steel, Inc.,2 the Supreme Court
may have limited the scope of this deference. The facts of Maislin
typify a growing trend in the motor carrier industry Under the
Interstate Commerce Act (the "Act"),3 motor common carriers
must file their rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission
(the "ICC"), 4 and both carriers and shippers must adhere to these
rates,5 unless the rate or the practice employed by the carrier is
unreasonable.6 Current practice is that "carriers and shippers ne-
gotiate rates lower than those on file with the ICC and the ship-
pers are billed for and remit payment at the negotiated rate."'7 In.
some of these cases, the negotiated rate is not filed with the ICC.
If the carrier then files for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee
may bill the shipper for the filed rate rather than the negotiated
rate, arguing that the statute compels the collection of the filed
rate.'
Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. ("Maislin") brought such an
action against Primary Steel, Inc. ("Primary") to recover freight
tariff undercharges made by Quinn Freight Lines ("Quinn"), a
subsidiary of Maislin, to Primary over a three year period.' Con-
trary to the agreement between the parties, Quinn never filed the
lower negotiated rates with the ICC. In 1983 Maislin filed for
bankruptcy, and an audit of its accounts revealed the reduced
rates charged to Primary Primary refused to pay the higher filed
1. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984).
2. 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990).
3. 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (1988).
4. Id. § 10762(a)(1).
5. Id. § 10761(a).
6. Id. §§ 10701(a), 10704(a)(1).
7. Maislin, 110 S. Ct. at 2763.
8. id.
9. Id. at 2764.
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rate, and Maislin's bankruptcy estate brought suit."°
The District Court found the dispute to be within the pri-
mary jurisdiction of the ICC, and thus, referred the case to the
ICC.1 The ICC found that it would be unreasonable to require
Primary to pay the filed rate. 2 The District Court determined
that the ICC's finding was supported by substantial evidence and
granted summary judgment in favor of Primary 13 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court, holding the
ICC's decision a reasonable accommodation of the conflicting pol-
icies that were committed to its administration by the Act.1 4 The
Supreme Court reversed, finding the ICC's decision directly con-
tradictory to previous Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
Act. 5 Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, filed a
lengthy dissent arguing that the ICC's interpretation of the Act
was reasonable, and that the Court failed to defer to the ICC's
reasonable interpretation of its governing statute.16
This comment will argue that the ICC's decision is a reasona-
ble interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act. As such, the
Supreme Court should have deferred to the ICC's decision under
the applicable guidelines for evaluating agency interpretations of
their governing statutes.17 By not deferring to the ICC's interpre-
tation in this case, the Supreme Court may be trying to send Con-
gress a message that the Court is unwilling to let agencies clean
up poorly drafted legislation. In Maislin, however, the Court's de-
cision produces an absurd and harsh result for the interested
parties.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Filed Rate Doctrine
The Interstate Commerce Act requires carriers to "publish
and file with the Commission tariffs containing the rates for trans-
10. Id. at 2764-65 & n.7.
II. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 705 F Supp. 1401, 1402 (W.D.
Mo. 1988).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1403.
14. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 879 F.2d 400, 4d6 (8th Cir.
1989).
15. Matslin, l10 S. Ct. at 2768, 2770.
16. Id. at 2779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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portation it may provide "8 The Act also prohibits carriers
from charging a rate other than the filed rate.19 The Supreme
Court repeatedly has insisted on a literal interpretation of these
sections of the Act, and has not permitted either a shipper's igno-
rance or the carrier's misquotation of the filed rate to serve as a
defense to the collection of the filed rate.20 This "filed rate doc-
trine" was deemed necessary to prevent unjust discrimination in
the carrier business. 2 '
The Act also provides, however, that "[a] rate (other than a
rail rate), classification, rule, or practice related to transportation
or service provided by a carrier must be reasonable. ' 22 The
ICC is to determine whether a rate or practice is unreasonable,
and to prescribe a substituted rate or practice in the event of a
finding of unreasonableness. 23 Therefore, a rate found unreasona-
ble by the ICC is not enforceable and is an exception to the filed
rate doctrine.24
B. The Negotiated Rates Policy
Recent legislative enactments have caused the ICC to reex-
amine the filed rate doctrine. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980
18. 49 U.S.C. § 10762(a)(1) (1988).
19.
Except as provided in this subtitle, a carrier providing transportation or service
subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall
provide that transportation or service only if the rate for the transportation or
service is contained in a tariff that is in effect under this subchapter. That car-
rier may not charge or receive a different compensation for that transportation
or service than the rate specified in the tariff whether by returning a part of that
rate to a person, giving a person a privilege, allowing the use of a facility that
effects the vale of that transportation or service, or another device.
Id. § 10761(a).
20. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915)
(carrier's misquotation of filed rate not an excuse for paying less than filed rate); Texas &
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U.S. 242, 245 (1906) (equitable defenses to the collection of
the filed rate forbidden).
21. See Maxwell, 237 U.S. at 97 ("This rule is undeniably strict and it obviously
may work hardship in some cases, but it embodies the policy which has been adopted by
Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce in order to prevent unjust discrimina-
tion."). By requiring strict adherence to the tariff, Congress intended to avoid intentional
misquotation of filed rates as-a means of offering secret discounts to particular shippers.
Western Transp. Co. v. Wilson & Co., 682 F.2d 1227, 1230-31 (7th Cir. 1982).
22. 49 U.S.C. § 10701(a).
23. Id. § 10704(a)(I).
24. See Maxwell, 237 U.S. at 97 (Filed rate applies "unless it is found by the Com-
mission to be unreasonable.").
1991]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
("MCA")2 5 relaxed the regulatory requirements and ICC over-
sight of motor carriers and thus allowed greater pricing freedom
and increased competition among carriers. The MCA also loos-
ened entry controls 26 which allowed carriers to increase rates
without ICC interference.2 7 These relaxed entry controls also al-
lowed carriers to operate as both common carriers and contract
carriers.28 A contract carrier transports the shipper's property
under an exclusive agreement,29 and the ICC has exempted con-
tract carriers from the requirements of filing their rates with the
ICC and charging only the filed rates.30 In addition to the MCA,
the ICC has relaxed its regulations, allowing decreased rates to go
into effect in as short a time as one day after the filing of a
tariff.3
In partial response to the changes embodied in the MCA, the
ICC abandoned its strict policy of adhering to the filed rate doc-
trine in virtually all cases. The first decision limiting the applica-
tion of the filed rate doctrine came in a rail carrier case, Buckeye
Cellulose Corp. v Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.3 2 In
Buckeye, the ICC modified its interpretation of the filed rate doc-
trine and determined that it was permitted to consider a shipper's
equitable defenses in a rail carrier's undercharge collection suit.
33
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this deter-
mination in Seaboard System Railroad v United States.34 The
Seaboard court agreed that "changed circumstances" warranted
reexamination of the ICC's previous policy of refusing to consider
equitable defenses.3 5 The court recognized that the Act "still em-
bodies the policies of nondiscrimination and uniformity The pri-
mary authority to give effect to those policies, though, is reposed
25. Motor Carriers Act, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
26. See id. § 5, 94 Stat. at 794-96 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10922 (1988)).
27. See id. § 11, 94 Stat. at 801-02 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10708 (1988)).
28. See id. § 10(b)(1), 94 Stat. at 800 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10930(a) (1988)).
29. See 49 U.S.C. § 10102(14) (1988).
30. See id. §§ 10761(b), 10762(a)(1).
31. See Short Notice Effectiveness for Independently Filed Motor Carrier & Freight
Forwarder Rates, I I.C.C.2d 146, 160 (1984), a.ff'd sub nom. Southern Motor Carriers
Rate Conference v. United States, 773 F.2d 1561 (1 lth Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Short No-
tice Effectiveness].
32. 1 I.C.C.2d 767 (1985), affd sub nora. Seaboard Sys. R.R. v. United States, 794
F.2d 635 (11 th Cir. 1986).
33. Id. at 773.
34, 794 F.2d 635 (11th Cir. 1986).
35. Id. at 638.
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in the ICC. 3 6
Shortly after Buckeye, the ICC considered the continuing ap-
plication of the filed rate doctrine in the motor carrier context. In
Negotiated Rates J 37 the ICC addressed complaints by shippers
that motor carriers were quoting lower rates not filed with the
ICC and then billing the shippers at the filed rates. 38 The ICC
found that its prior policy of strictly applying the filed rate doc-
trine was "inappropriate and unnecessary to deter discrimination
today "" The ICC noted that thousands of motor carrier rates are
negotiated daily, making it extremely difficult for shippers to de-
termine if the agreed upon rate is actually on file.40 The ICC as-
serted that it had the authority under section 10701 to determine
whether collecting the difference between the negotiated and filed
rate would constitute an unreasonable practice and thus be pro-
hibited by the Act.41 The ICC then set forth its approach to such
undercharge claims:
We would, at a court's request, determine, based on all relevant
circumstances, whether collection of undercharges based on the
rate contained in the filed tariff would constitute an unreasona-
ble practice and, if a negotiated rate is found to exist, whether
this amount is all the carrier should be permitted to collect. The
referring court would retain final authority to set the remedy, if
any, and review our determination. 42
The ICC concluded that it was not abolishing the requirement to
file a tariff rate according to section 10761 of the Act. The ICC
explained that it was merely asserting its authority to determine
the reasonableness of tariff rates under section 10701. 43
The ICC clarified its authority to declare tariff practices un-
reasonable in 1989 44 In Negotiated Rates II, the ICC explained
that its policy was not a relaxation of section 10761 but a separate
36. Id. (citing Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 304 (1976)).
37. National Indus. Transp. League - Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negoti-
ated Motor Common Carrier Rates, 3 I.C.C.2d 99 (1986) [hereinafter Negotiated Rates
1].
38. See id. at 99.
39. Id. at 106.
40. Id. at 105.
41. Id. at 103.
42. Id. at 107.
43. Id. at 108.
44. National Indus. Transp. League - Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negoti-
ated Motor Common Carrier Rates, 5 I.C.C.2d 623 (1989) [hereinafter Negotiated Rates
I1].
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determination under section 10701 15 Nevertheless, the ICC as-
serted that it has the authority to reinterpret the Act based on
new developments.46 Rather than creating an exception to the filed
rate doctrine, the ICC determined an unreasonable practice to be
"(1) negotiating a rate; (2) agreeing to a rate that the shipper
reasonably relies upon as being lawfully filed; (3) failing, either
willfully or otherwise, to publish the rate; (4) billing and ac-
cepting payment at the negotiated rate for (sometimes) numerous
shipments; and (5) then demanding additional payment at higher
rates."4 Appellate courts have disagreed on whether the above
Negotiated Rates policy is consistent with the Act.48 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Maislin to resolve this conflict.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN Maislin
A. The Majority Opinion
After tracing the history and statutory background of the
filed rate doctrine, the majority, in an opinion written by Justice
Brennan, set out the ICC's Negotiated Rates policy and re-
sponded to three arguments urging application of the ICC's newer
policy Primary first argued that the ICC's Negotiated Rates pol-
icy was entitled to deference by the courts.4" They contended that
45. Id. at 631.
46. Id.
Regulatory agencies do not establish rules of conduct to last forever; they are
supposed, within the limits of the law and of fair and prudent administration, to
adapt their rules and practices to the Nation's needs in a volatile, changing econ-
omy. They are neither required nor supposed to regulate the present and the
future within the inflexible limits of yesterday.
Id. (quoting American Trucking Ass'ns v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 387 U.S.
397, 416 (1967)).
47. Id. at 628 & n.l .
48. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759; 2765 & n.8.
49. Id. at 2768. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, considered the appropri-
ate standard of review of an agency's construction of the statute that it administers, hold-
ing that a court must consider two questions:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter:
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction of the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to eluci-
date a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations
[Vol. 41:627
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section 10701 does not specifically address the types of practice
that are to be considered "unreasonable" under the Act. Primary
argued that the Court should therefore have accepted the ICC's
construction of the Act defining a carrier's attempt at collecting
the filed rate after the parties have negotiated a lower rate as an
unreasonable practice. Since the ICC's construction was rational
and consistent with the statute, the Court should have deferred to
its construction. 50 The majority was quick to dismiss this argu-
ment, noting that the Supreme Court has consistently held that
the Act forbids the collection of rates lower than the filed rate.51
The majority emphasized that once the Supreme Court has deter-
mined the meaning of a statute, subsequent agency interpretations
of that statute must be judged against the Court's previous deter-
mination. The majority found that the ICC's deviation from the
filed rate doctrine through its interpretation of the "unreasonable
practice" clause in section 10701 was inconsistent with prior
Court decisions, Congressional intent, and the statutory scheme as
a whole.52
The second argument in support of the Negotiated Rates pol-
icy was that the policy prevents a carrier from receiving a windfall
from its failure to comply with the Act.5" Under the filed rate
doctrine, failure to file a negotiated rate in compliance with the
Act would permit the carrier to collect the higher, filed rate. In
response to this argument, the majority maintained that despite its
harsh results, a strict adherence to the filed rate is necessary for
the enforcement of the Act.54 While the majority admitted that
the ICC has the power to craft remedies for violations of the
Act,55 it nevertheless held that the Negotiated Rates policy "ren-
are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a
particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable inter-
pretation made by the administrator of an agency.
467 U.S. at 842-44 (footnotes omitted).
50. Maislin, I10 S. Ct. at 2768 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2769 (citing Regular Common Carrier Conference v. United States, 793
F.2d 376, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1986)("Without [these provisions] it would be monumen-
tally difficult to enforce the requirement that rates be reasonable and nondiscriminatory,
and virtually impossible for the public to assert its right to challenge the lawfulness of
existing or proposed rates ")).
55. Id. (citing ICC v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 467 U.S. 354, 364-65 (1984)).
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ders nugatory the requirements of §§ 10761 and 10762 and con-
flicts directly with the core purposes of the Act."156
Third, Primary argued that the MCA substantially deregu-
lated the motor carrier industry, making strict adherence to the
filed rate doctrine unnecessary to accomplish the goal of prevent-
Ing discrimination. 7 Under the Motor Carrier Act, carriers have
the authority to increase rates with little or no interference from
the ICC.58 The Motor Carrier Act also allows motor carriers to
operate as both common carriers and contract carriers, 59 with con-
tract carriers being exempt from the requirements of sections
10761 and 10762.60 In addition to this deregulation of the motor
carrier industry, the ICC has used its rulemaking power to relax
its own regulations and has allowed decreased rates to go into ef-
fect in as little as one day after the filing of a tariff.61 From this
policy of deregulation, Primary argued that the increase in compe-
tition made compliance with the filed rate doctrine unnecessary
While the majority accepted the notion that the ICC has the
power to adopt new polices when faced with changing circum-
stances, 2 the majority rejected this argument and held that the
Negotiated Rates doctrine directly contradicted the ICC's gov-
erning statute by rendering sections 10761 and 10762 ineffec-
tive.6 3 The majority reasoned that since Congress did not disturb
sections 10761 and 10762 in the Motor Carrier Act, these sections
must still be defined according to their long-standing judicial in-
terpretation.64 Finally, the majority reasoned that if strict adher-
ence to sections 10761 and 10762 was no longer justified in light
56. Id.
57. Id at 2769-70.
58. See Pub. L. 96-296 § 11, 94 Stat. 793, 801-02 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10708
(1988)).
59. See id. § 10(b)(1), 94 Stat. at 800 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10930(a) (1988)).
60. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 10761(b), 10762(a)(1) (1988).
61. See Short Notice Effectiveness, 1 I.C.C.2d 146, 160 (1984), affid sub non.
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 773 F.2d 1561 (ilth Cir.
1985).
62. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Indus., Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759, 2770 (1990)
(citing American Trucking Ass'ns v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. 387 U.S. 397,
416 (1967)).
63. Id.
64. Id. The majority went on to compare this case with Square D Co. v. Niagara
Frontier Traffic Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986), where the Court determined that
"Congress must be presumed to have been fully cognizant of this interpretation of the
statutory scheme and Congress did not see fit to change it when Congress care-
fully reexamined this area of the law in 1980." Id. at 420.
[Vol. 41:627
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of the Motor Carrier Act, it was up to Congress to eliminate these
sections.65
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, filed a
lengthy and persuasive dissent. Justice Stevens first questioned the
logic of the majority by pointing out that while the majority found
an interplay between sections 10761(a) and 10762(a)(1), which
would be "rendered nugatory" if carriers were not allowed to col-
lect the filed rate instead of a lower negotiated rate, the majority
recognized that these sections are susceptible to exceptions, such
as an unreasonable rate.66 Thus, the majority could only argue
that the Negotiated Rates policy was impermissible.6 7 Specifi-
cally, Justice Stevens found an interplay between the "[e]xcept as
provided" language in the first clause of section 10761(a), " and
the language of section 10701(a) giving the ICC the power to de-
termine the reasonableness of a carrier's practices.6 9 Justice Ste-
vens also maintained that the filed rate doctrine would continue to
provide recovery of undercharges is some cases, and that failure to
comply with sections 10761 and 10762 could still lead to criminal
prosecution.70 Since these sections would not be "rendered nuga-
tory" under the Negotiated Rates policy, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that the Negotiated Rates policy did not conflict with any
particular section of the Act.
Justice Stevens next attacked the majority's contention that
the ICC's construction of the Act was inconsistent with the regu-
latory scheme as a whole. While the filed rate doctrine was once
deemed necessary to support the ICC's policy of anti-discrimina-
tion, the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 represented a movement to-
ward deregulation and rendered the application of the filed rate
doctrine an anachronism overnight.71 With this shift, Congress
65. Maislin, 110 S. Ct. at 2771.
66. Id. at 2774 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority also refused to hold that the
unreasonableness of a practice can never bar collection of a filed rate. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
67. Id. (Steven, J., dlissenting),
68. 49 U.S.C. § 10761(a) (1988). For a full quotation of section 10761(a), see supra
note 19.
69. Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct 2759, 2774-75 (1988)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2777 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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changed the core purposes of the Act in order to promote competi-
tive and efficient transportation services.72 Thus, Justice Stevens
found that "'no public object is served by forcing carriers to ad-
here to published price schedules regardless of circumstances.' ",73
Hence, Justice Stevens argued, a strict adherence to the filed rate
doctrine would produce absurd results and serve no social purpose.
Moreover, the majority did not give appropriate deference to the
ICC's Negotiated Rates policy 71
Justice Stevens also found fault in the majority's failure to
discuss Chevron, or any other case involving deference to agency
discretion, especially since four Courts of Appeals had invoked
Chevron in upholding the ICC's Negotiated Rates policy 7' This
error was compounded by the majority's reliance on cases that up-
held longstanding Supreme Court interpretations of statutes hav-
ing nothing to do with the question presented in Mazslin.7 6
Lastly, Justice Stevens agreed with the ICC that an unrea-
sonable practice would exist if a carrier were allowed to collect an
undercharge on the particular facts of Maislin." Stevens argued
that, "[t]he only consequence of today's misguided decision is to
produce a bonanza for the bankruptcy bar."'7 8
C. The Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia addressed some of
Justice Stevens' arguments. Justice Scalia first asserted that the
filed rate doctrine is based on the text of the statute, rather than
the regulatory scheme as a whole. 9 Justice Scalia read the statute
as an explicit prohibition on the collection of a rate other than the
72. See 49 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2).
73. Maislin, 110 S.Ct. at 2778 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Orscheln Bros.
Truck Lines v. Zenith Elec. Corp., 899 F.2d 642, 645 (7th Cir.), cert. granted and judg-
ment vacated, 111 S. Ct. 334 (1990)).
74. Id. at 2779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 2779 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2779 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Specifically, the majority incorrectly relied
on Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986). In Square
D, the Court adhered to a longstanding construction of the Clayton Act despite statutory
amendment when no question of agency interpretation was presented. Id. at 420. In addi-
tion, the majority relied on California v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 110 S. Ct.
2024 (1990), where the agency interpretation conformed with longstanding Supreme Court
precedent. 110 S. Ct. at 2029-30.
77. Maislin, 110 S. Ct. at 2780 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2771 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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filed rate."0
Justice Scalia also rejected the asserted interrelationship be-
tween sections 10761(a) and 10701 found by Justice Stevens
stemming from the "[e]xcept as provided" language in section
10761(a). Justice Scalia contended that this clause modified the
first sentence only and could not be imported into the second sen-
tence to recite an exception to the obligation to charge only the
filed rate."' Justice Scalia argued that the exception to the filed
rate doctrine for unreasonable rates does not come from the
"[e]xcept as provided" language of Section 10761(a), but rather
from the need to reconcile the provisions in section 10761(a). with
section 10701 (a). Justice Scalia argued that while charging an un-
reasonable rate undoubtedly violated the prohibition against un-
reasonable rates, charging the filed rate when a different rate had
been promised did not unavoidably conflict with the prohibition
against unreasonable practices.82 Thus, the unreasonable rate ex-
ception came directly from the statute, while the Negotiated
Rates policy did not.
Justice Scalia then contended that the Motor Carrier Act
represents an intent by Congress to deregulate, but "within the
framework of the existing statutory scheme. '8 3 Justice Scalia be-
lieved that even if Congress's goal of deregulation was not
achieved within the framework of the promulgated statute, neither
the ICC nor the courts should disturb Congress' chosen scheme.8 4
III. ANALYSIS
The majority opinion in Maislin ignores the usual standard of
deference given to an agency's interpretation of the statute it ad-
ministers as set out in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v National Resources
Defense Council, Inc.8 5 Instead, the majority chose to interpret
80. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 2771-72 (Scalia, J., concurring). In a footnote, Justice Stevens admitted
that Scalia's interpretation was a possible reading of section 10761(a), but obviously not
the only one, nor one which the ICC must accept. Id. at 2774 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2772 (Scalia, J., concurring).
83. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
84. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
85. 469 U.S. 837 (1984). Professor Douglas Leslie's comments on the Supreme
Court's deference to agency interpretations in the labor law context seem applicable to this
case:
Had the members of the Supreme Court liked the Board's result in this
case, we probably would have found in the Court's opinion references to the
Board's expertise and comments about the Board's role as the primary inter-
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the statute itself, without taking into account the recent changes
in the motor carrier industry and the legislation affecting motor
carriers. The majority utilized an overly rigid reading of the Inter-
state Commerce Act that produces harsh results, effectively send-
ing Congress, and not the agencies, a message. The majority may
be telling Congress to legislate more wisely, as the Court will no
longer use its powers of interpretation to harmonize statutory sec-
tions that are in conflict with each other or with the goals of the
statutory scheme. Furthermore, the Court will not allow an
agency to rehabilitate Congress' poorly drafted legislation either.
In Chevron, the Supreme Court noted the importance of de-
ferring to an agency's reasonable interpretation of its governing
statute.86 The Court also announced the standard of review for an
agency's interpretation of its governing statute: where Congress
has not spoken directly to the question at issue, the court will up-
hold an agency's interpretation if it is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute.8 7 The Court ruled that "[i]f Congress has
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express dele-
gation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision
of the statute by regulation." ' This legislative delegation may be
implicit rather than explicit, but in either case a court must defer
to an agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute.8"
Justice Stevens, who authored Chevron, and at least four
Courts of Appeals who have considered the matter, agreed that
Chevron should control the issues presented in this case.90 Since
Maislin reviews an administrative agency decision, Chevron is the
appropriate standard for reviewing that decision, so long as Con-
gress has given the agency authority to interpret its governing
statute. In Maislin, the ICC based its decision not to apply the
filed rate doctrine on the wording of sections 10701 and 10704 of
the Act. Section 10701 declares that practices by carriers must be
reasonable. 9' Section 10704(a)(1) gives the ICC the power to de-
preter of the statute. Not liking the result in this case, the Court doesn't include
such language.
D. LESLIE. CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS AND POLICY 448 (2d ed.
1985).
86. 469 U.S. at 844.
87. Id. at 843.
88. Id. at 843-44.
89. Id. at 844.
90. Maislin, 110 S. Ct. at 2779 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. 49 U.S.C. § 10701(a) (1988).
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termine if a practice is "unreasonable." 9 2 Yet, nowhere in the Act
is a reasonable or unreasonable practice defined. Thus, Congress
has plainly left a gap for the agency to fill, and the agency's deter-
mination should be upheld unless "arbitrary, capricious, or mani-
festly contrary to the statute." 3 At the very least, the fact that
Congress has not defined these terms creates an implicit delega-
tion to the agency, in which case the agency's interpretation
should be upheld as long as it is reasonable.94
The ICC's Negotiated Rates policy is a reasonable interpre-
tation of the conflicting sections of the Interstate Commerce Act
in light of the increased competitive pressures, statutory changes,
and relaxed regulatory climate in the motor carrier industry In
the years before the Motor Carrier Act, carriers did not enjoy the
freedom and flexibility to negotiate particularized rate agreements
with shippers. Carriers essentially charged the same rate for all
freight shipped a similar distance. Consequently, it was not hard
for shippers to discover the filed rate.9" Thus, during the era
before the Motor Carrier Act, shippers had no defense to paying
the filed rate. In modern practice, thousands of carriers operate
with broad authority and increased pricing freedom. These carri-
ers must offer competitive prices on extremely short notice. Hun-
dreds of motor carrier rates are negotiated daily,96 and may go
into effect in as little as one day after being filed. In this atmo-
sphere, shippers have a difficult time determining whether the ne-
gotiated rate is actually on file.
In light of these changing circumstances, the ICC changed its
policy from the filed rate doctrine to the one set out in Negotiated
Rates L There is no doubt an agency may change its rules and
practices when faced with new developments." The Negotiated
Rates policy puts the burden of any failures in filing the negoti-
ated rate on the carrier. The carrier is in a better position to bear
this burden since it is the party that files the rates and can pre-
cisely determine the filed rate for a specific day However, the
filed rate doctrine puts this burden on the shippers, who are at a
disadvantage to discover the filed rates, and thus frustrates the
92. 49 U.S.C. § I0704(a)(I).
93. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
94. Id.
95. See Negotiated Rates I, 3 I.C.C.2d 99, 104 (1986).
96. See id. at 105.
97. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 387
U.S. 397, 416 (1967).
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competitive and efficient goals of today's Interstate Commerce
Act. The Negotiated Rates policy is therefore a reasonable way to
harmonize conflicting provisions of the Act with changing devel-
opments in the motor carrier trade. It should have been accepted
by the Court, under Chevron, as an appropriate agency interpreta-
tion given the gap created by Congress's use of the words "reason-
able" and "unreasonable" to modify the word "practice" in sec-
tions 10701(a) and 10704(a)(1).
Both the majority and concurrence are inconsistent in holding
that the ICC's interpretation of the term "reasonable" is not a
reasonable interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act. More-
over, both opinions agree that there are limits to the filed rate
doctrine, such as the reasonableness of the filed rate. In that
sense, they admit that, in at least one case, section 10701 can be
used to override the requirements of the filed rate doctrine. It is
difficult to understand why an unreasonable rate can override this
policy while an unreasonable practice cannot. Surely Congress in-
tended there to be some meaning to the Act's prohibition against
unreasonable practices. By not defining the phrase "unreasonable
practices," Congress entrusted the ICC with this function even if
the given meaning occasionally conflicts with other sections of the
Act.
The real problem in Maislin may be that both the Court and
the agency were trying to deal with "shoddy" legislation. The Mo-
tor Carrier Act of 1980 relaxed the Interstate Commerce Act's
regulatory requirements to create a competitive environment
through new pricing freedom. But Congress left sections 10761(a)
and 10762(a)(1) fully intact. These sections frustrate the purpose
and spirit of the Motor Carrier Act by requiring only the filed
rates to be charged, thus creating an inflexible regulatory environ-
ment. The ICC attempted to read the harshness of these sections
out of the Act in order to achieve the purposes of the Motor Car-
rier Act. The Court, however, insists that Congress clean up its
own mess, and until it does the Court will interpret the Act ac-
cording to its language and structure 8 The Court will interpret
the Act in this manner even if the filed rates doctrine creates an
inflexible regulatory environment which is inconsistent with the
purposes of the Motor Carrier Act.99
While this approach by the Court may have some merit, it
98. Maislin, 110 S. Ct. at 2768.
99. Id. at 2772 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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produces harsh results in the short term and may ignore the com-
plexities of the modern administrative system. Congress does need
to be reminded to monitor the quality of its legislation. In addi-
tion, responsible legislators should not leave conflicting sections in
a statute that hinder the goals of its regulatory policy Congress
must be responsible for cleaning up its own mistakes and cannot
continually rely on agencies to do the job. However, the cost of
sending Congress the particular message of Maislin may be too
great. Shippers are now faced with the high costs of discovering
the filed rates, which have dramatically increased in number be-
cause of the ease of filing tariffs and the possibility that the filed
rate may become effective in as little as a day The plight of ship-
pers who have already relied on a negotiated rate that was lower
than the filed rate is even more desperate. Shippers are defenseless
in an undercharge action brought by carriers who may have
agreed to file a negotiated rate and then failed to do so. Maislin
rewards carriers and to some extent the bankruptcy bar, for their
failure to file the appropriate rate with the ICC.
Lastly, the Court ignored the necessity of congressional dele-
gation to administrative agencies. Congress has neither the time
nor the expertise to enact all the legislation that effective govern-
ment requires. Agencies such as the ICC are empowered by Con-
gress to fill in gaps and reconcile ambiguities within their gov-
erning statutes. Therefore, courts should defer to agency
interpretations when agencies function within their appropriate
role. Only then will the administrative system be able to operate
efficiently
DENNIS L. MURPHY
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